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DNA Probabilities in People v. Prince:
When are racial and ethnic statistics
relevant?
David H. Kaye1
Arizona State University
Abstract: When a defendant’s DNA matches a sample found at a crime
scene, how compelling is the match? To answer this question, DNA analysts
typically use relative frequencies, random-match probabilities or likelihood ra-
tios. They compute these quantities for the major racial or ethnic groups in the
United States, supplying prosecutors with such mind-boggling figures as “one
in nine hundred and fifty sextillion African Americans, one in one hundred
and thirty septillion Caucasians, and one in nine hundred and thirty sextillion
Hispanics.” In People v. Prince, a California Court of Appeals rejected this
practice on the theory that only the perpetrator’s race is relevant to the crime;
hence, it is impermissible to introduce statistics about other races. This paper
critiques this reasoning. Relying on the concept of likelihood, it presents a log-
ical justification for referring to a range of races and identifies some problems
with the one-race-only rule. The paper also notes some ways to express the
probative value of a DNA match quantitatively without referring to variations
in DNA profile frequencies among races or ethnic groups.
1. Introduction
For two decades, the legal system has grappled with DNA evidence. The most
difficult issues have not been technological, but statistical and logical. When a
defendant’s DNA matches that found at a crime scene, DNA analysts typically
apply a population-genetics model to derive genotype frequencies from estimates
of allele frequencies in the major racial or ethnic groups in the United States. But
these estimates have been controversial. There have been objections to the quality
and quantity of the data on DNA allele frequencies, the realism of the population-
genetics models, and the manner in which the genotype frequencies are presented
to judges and jurors.2
The case of People v. Prince3 involves the problem of presentation rather than
computation. In Prince, the California Court of Appeals stated that a genotype
frequency estimate for a racial or ethnic group, no matter how well founded, is not
relevant to determining whether the defendant is the source of the crime-scene DNA
1Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, McAllister & Orange Streets,
P. O. Box 877906 Tempe, AZ 85287-7906, USA, e-mail: David.Kaye@asu.edu
AMS 2000 subject classifications: 62-06, 62P10, 62P99, 92D99.
Keywords and phrases: conditional relevance, DNA evidence, expert testimony, genotype fre-
quencies, likelihood ratio, preliminary-fact rule, population-genetics model, random-match prob-
ability.
2See generally 4 Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony ch. 32
(David Faigman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005-2006).
336 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, 132 P.3d 210 (Cal. 2006), rev. dismissed,
142 P.2d 1184 (Cal. 2006).
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unless there is “independent evidence” that the perpetrator is of the same race or
ethnicity as the defendant. At the same time, the court held that sufficient evidence
(other than the DNA match) that the defendant is the culprit can establish this
preliminary fact and thus make the frequency in the defendant’s racial or ethnic
group relevant.
This chapter maintains that both these propositions are false. Relying on a
likelihood-based theory of relevance, I first show that the population statistics for
various “races” or ethnic groups ordinarily are relevant without regard to the defen-
dant’s race or ethnicity. They are relevant because they indicate that it is improb-
able that an innocent defendant would have a DNA genotype that just happens to
match that of the actual perpetrator.
Second, I explain that, if it were true that frequencies in major subpopulations
were only conditionally relevant, this condition normally could not be satisfied by
other evidence that the defendant is guilty. Instead, evidence that makes it more
probable that some other member of his racial or ethnic group (as opposed to any
other such group) is the culprit would be necessary. Evidence that only singles out
the defendant but otherwise provides no information about the race or ethnicity of
the perpetrator does not help satisfy the court’s condition.
After criticizing the reasoning in People v. Prince as to conditional relevance,
I consider another objection to presenting the genotype frequency estimates for
specific racial or ethnic groups. This is the possibility, emphasized in Prince, that a
juror will jump to the conclusion that because the frequency in the defendant’s racial
and ethnic group is mentioned, the perpetrator must belong to this subpopulation. I
argue that this concern, while appropriate in some cases, does not justify excluding
reasonable estimates of genotype frequencies by racial or ethnic groupings.4
2. The court of appeals opinion
Patrick Paul Prince was charged with twelve counts of burglary, assault, and sexual
crimes against five victims. In two of the attacks, “DNA matching his was found on
a mask that each girl identified as having been worn by her attacker.”5 Compara-
ble evidence was not available in the other crimes, but the prosecution maintained
that the modus operandi was so distinctive that all had to have been committed
by the same individual. A criminalist found DNA on the mask and discovered that
it matched Prince’s at nine STR loci. She testified about “a likelihood ratio that
compared two different alternative possibilities, i.e., either the individual contribut-
ing the known reference sample contributed the evidence DNA and that is why the
profiles matched; or the evidence DNA was contributed by some unknown, unre-
lated individual who happened to have the same DNA profile.”6 Using data from
the FBI on three samples of about 200 Caucasians, 200 Hispanics, and 200 African-
Americans, she concluded that “for the Caucasian population, the evidence DNA
4The Supreme Court of California reached the same conclusion and also rejected the view that
subgroup frequencies are only conditionally relevant in People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864 (Cal. 2006).
The state supreme court also granted review in Prince and then dismissed the grant of review
“[i]n light of our decision in People v. Wilson . . . .” 142 P.3d 1183 (Cal. 2006). This resolves a
split between the different divisions of the California Court of Appeals. In light of the opinion in
Wilson and the granting of review in Prince itself, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Prince no
longer has precedential value in California. The case remains noteworthy, however, both because
courts in other jurisdictions might find it attractive and because it is a stark example of how
seemingly simple statistics can generate considerable confusion in the legal system.
536 Cal.Rptr.3d at 303.
6Id. at 310.
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profile was approximately 1.9 trillion times more likely to match appellant’s DNA
profile if he was the contributor of that DNA rather than some unknown, unrelated
individual; for the Hispanic population, it was 2.6 trillion times more likely; and
for the African-American population; it was about 9.1 trillion times more likely.”7
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced
Prince to prison for well over 75 years and imposed monetary penalties. Prince
appealed, primarily on the ground that “this statistical evidence was irrelevant
because the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence to prove that the
perpetrator was Caucasian, Hispanic, or African-American.”8 The California Court
of Appeals agreed that independent evidence had to establish the racial or ethnic
identity of the perpetrator for any statistics on the frequency of a DNA genotype in
that racial or ethnic group to be relevant. However, it reasoned that because there
was substantial non-DNA evidence linking Prince, a Caucasian, to the two crimes,
the statistic for Caucasians was relevant and properly admitted. It regarded the
admission of the statistics for Hispanics and African-Americans as erroneous, but
harmless. Despite the perceived errors at trial, the Court of Appeals thus affirmed
the convictions.9
This result is correct, but not for the reasons offered by the court. It is wrong
to say, as the court does, that “[t]he probative value (hence, the relevancy) of
a [DNA] profile’s frequency in an ethnic population depends on proof that the
perpetrator belongs to that ethnic group.”10 Moreover, the court’s thought that
the other evidence against Prince made the likelihood ratio of 1.9 trillion relevant
is inconsistent with the logic behind introducing the likelihood ratio as a measure of
probative value. To explain why, we must first clear away a bit of legal and logical
underbrush.
3. The meaning of relevance
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove
or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.”11 Consequently, to the extent that a DNA match tends to prove that
the biological trace evidence that apparently originated from the perpetrator of
the crime came from the defendant’s cells, it is relevant. A DNA match has this
tendency when the probability of observing the matching trace evidence is greater if
the defendant is the source than if someone else is.12 If E stands for the observations
of the DNA genotypes, and if D represents the hypothesis that the defendant (D)
is the source, while I represents the hypothesis any other individual is the source,
then the evidence E is relevant to prove D if and only if P (E|D) > P (E|I). In
7Id.
8Id.
9More precisely, it affirmed the convictions on ten counts and reversed the convictions on
another two counts. Id. at 327.
10Id. at 304.
11Cal. Evid. Code §210; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
12See D.H. Kaye, The Relevance of “Matching” DNA: Is the Window Half Open or Half
Shut?, 85 J. Crim. L. & Crimin. 676 (1995); Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as
Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 303
(1991).
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other words, E is relevant (and tends to prove D) if and only if
(1) LR =
P (E|D)
P (E|I)
> 1.
But how do we know that the likelihood ratio LR exceeds 1? This is where the
frequencies in Prince come in. If the evidence is very likely to arise when D is
the source and very unlikely when someone else is, then the numerator in (1) is
much greater than the denominator, i.e., LR ≫ 1. E is then not only relevant but
also highly probative.13 Putting to the side such complications as the possibility
of cross-contamination that would produce a false-positive match, if the matching
DNA genotype is very rare among individuals other than D, then LR ≫ 1. Thus,
the figures quoted in Prince are relevant if they tend to show that condition (1)
holds.
4. A hypothetical case
To establish that the DNA statistics in Prince tend to show how probative the DNA
match is, it may be helpful to consider a hypothetical case. Suppose that a man
wearing a mask murdered a student in her dormitory room at two a.m. The building
always is locked from midnight until 6 a.m., and tapes from surveillance cameras
on all possible entrances to the building demonstrate that no one entered or left the
building in that period. The police arrived at 6 a.m., when they sealed and searched
the building. They recovered the mask in the hallway and obtained a multilocus
genotype from saliva extracted from the mask. They also took DNA samples from
all people who were in the building overnight. One of these individuals (D), was
found to have matching DNA (MD). DNA from the remaining n individuals was
collected. In each instance, the DNA did not match that from the mask (MCi ).
Unless the unique match can be attributed to handling or laboratory error or fraud,
the conclusion that D’s DNA was on the mask is inescapable.14 Although no formal
analysis is necessary in this case, in more realistic situations and in understanding
the implications of DNA testing of more than one individual, it is useful to specify
the likelihoods.15 Here, the DNA tests provide diagnostically valuable evidence
with respect to n+1 hypotheses – one for D, and another n corresponding to every
other person in the building. One hypothesis is that D is the source of the DNA
on the mask. As before, we denote this by D. The other hypotheses are that each
individual I (other than D) is the source. These hypotheses can be denoted by Ii
(where i = 1, . . . , n). With this notation, the evidence E is the match to D and
only D:
(2) E = MD
n⋂
i=1
MCi .
13Arguments for using likelihood ratios to measure probative value are presented in D.H. Kaye
& J.J. Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value, 27 Law & Hum. Behav. 645, 645–659
(2003).
14Being the source of the DNA on the mask is not logically equivalent to being the assailant.
To draw that inference, we would need assure ourselves that the assailant wore this mask, that he
left his DNA on it, and that this is the DNA that was detected.
15See generally David J. Balding, Weight-of-Evidence for Forensic DNA Profiles (2005); Pe-
ter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal Consumption of
Scientific Evidence, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 931 (1999).
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If the hypothesis D is true, then P (E|D) > 0. Indeed, assuming that the match
is not the result of laboratory or handling error, then D is certain to match and
everyone else is almost certain not to match (when D’s genotype is very rare and
hence very unlikely to be seen in the n other individuals who were tested). In these
circumstances, P (E|D) is close to 1.
As for the denominator, if D is not the source of the DNA, but some other
individual Ia in the building is, then D is very unlikely to match (as are all the
other innocent individuals) but the assailant Ia is certain to match (again assuming
that the reported genotypes are the true genotypes of each individual). Yet, every
other possible suspect did not match. The evidence is thus impossible under the
hypothesis that a specific person (Ia) other than D is the source. The conditional
probability of E is therefore
(3) P (E|Ia) = 0.
Hence, the likelihood ratio is a number close to 1 divided by 0, which is undefined
(or infinite, as it must be if the claim that E deductively implies D is correct).
To shed light on the court’s claim that statistics on the frequency of the DNA
genotype in a given racial or ethnic group are irrelevant unless there is proof that
the perpetrator is a member of this group, we introduce two factual variations.
First, assume that D was the first person tested, that he matched, and that no
one else was tested. This evidence is less complete but more like that in Prince. In
contrast to (2), now
(4) E = MD.
For this evidence, the numerator of (1) is simply the likelihood that D would
match if he were the source. This is P (E|D) = P (MD|D) = 1. The denominator is
the likelihood that D would match if he were not the source of the DNA. Continuing
to assume that there are no explanations such as fraud or error, and assuming that
D was not selected for testing based on his genotype (or anything correlated to it),
he can be regarded as a random draw from the population. The probability that
he would have the misfortune of sharing the actual assailant’s genotype is simply
the frequency of this genotype in the population. Denoting this frequency as f , we
can write P(E|Ia) = P (MD|Ia) = f . We conclude that the likelihood ratio is
(5)
P (E|D)
P (E|Ia)
=
1
f
.
Second, assume that 1
2
of the dormitory’s residents are Caucasian, 1
8
are Hispanic,
1
8
are African-American, and the remaining 1
4
have other ancestries. Assume further
that f is not known but that the genotype frequencies within the first three groups
are known to be fC , fH , and fA, respectively. It would be better to learn f itself,
but fC , fH , and fA are useful in indicating the magnitude of f . The jury can
make better use of the evidence of MD if it knows how rare the genotypes are in
several major population groups (or even one such group) than if it has no frequency
information and must resort to uninformed guessing. The figures can assist the jury
in deciding what value to attach to the finding of a match to the defendant. The
criminalist in Prince made this explicit by testifying to the likelihood ratio in (5).
Furthermore, even if one does not accept the likelihood ratio as the measure of
probative value, it still should be clear that the three frequencies are at least rele-
vant. They help the jury to gauge how surprising MD is under the hypothesis that
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the culprit is unrelated to D and that D just happens to have the same genotype.16
In other words, they convey a sense of the p-value for the null hypothesis Ia. If these
numbers are as infinitesimal as the criminalist asserted, then a juror can reject the
hypothesis that the match is an unfortunate coincidence.
5. Ethnicity as a “preliminary fact”
The court of appeals rejected this seemingly ineluctable conclusion. It wrote that:
[A]ny [frequencies] that do not [come from] the perpetrator’s racial group are irrele-
vant, of themselves, to establish that the defendant is likely the perpetrator. . . . The
selection of three individual ethnic databases, even assuming they represent the three
largest population groups, is insufficient for this purpose because they have no value
independent of the ethnicity of the perpetrator. All such evidence tells the jury is
that the DNA profile is statistically rare in those population groups. It neither ex-
cludes nor includes the perpetrator as a member of any of those groups, nor does
it specifically identify the defendant as being in the same population group as the
perpetrator.17
This is not a claim that the frequency evidence is relevant but inadmissible
because it will confuse the jury. It is not a claim that the population genetics
model underlying the estimate is speculative or not generally accepted. It is not
a claim that categories like “Caucasian,” “Hispanic,” and “African American” are
socially constructed and devoid of essential meaning. It is not a claim that the
frequencies fail to account for the probability of laboratory or handling error. The
court does not bar the introduction of the racial and ethnic frequencies on any of
these possible grounds. Rather, it asserts that the frequencies are logically irrelevant
unless another fact first is established on the basis of other evidence: “The probative
value (hence, the relevancy) of a profile’s frequency in an ethnic population depends
on proof that the perpetrator belongs to that ethnic group.”18
In many cases, some evidence of the perpetrator’s ethnicity will be available. If
another dormitory resident had noticed a dark-skinned individual slipping out from
the deceased’s room, the court’s reasoning would permit fA and fH to be admitted
(but not fC (?) even though the ethnic identification is fallible and there is a broad
range of skin coloration within all the subgroups). In a “general-population case,”19
however, no evidence points to any subgroup member (racial, ethnic, or otherwise).
The applicable frequency is that in the general population (f).
Yet, Prince insists that “because the frequency with which a genetic profile
occurs varies according to ethnicity, it cannot be concluded the defendant likely
left the biological evidence at the crime scene or on inculpatory matter absent
some evidence that the person who left it belongs to the same ethnic group as the
defendant.”20 Well, why not? Suppose that genotype frequencies were produced not
only for the three subpopulations in Prince but for ten or twenty other subgroups –
from Sephardic Jews, to Irish Catholics, to Naxi Dongba – and these frequencies
16 See D.H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence §12.3.4
(2004).
17Prince, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d at 313–14.
18Id. at 304; see also id. at 308 (“the perpetrator’s ethnicity should have been established
independently”).
19David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7 Harv.
J. L. & Tech. 101 (1993). Of course, even in a “subpopulation case” in which there is information
as to the perpetrator’s race or ethnicity, recourse to other subgroups may be appropriate. The
information pointing to a single racial or ethnic group is unlikely to be so conclusive as to preclude
the jury from considering other possibilities.
2036 Cal.Rptr.3d at 322.
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were all quite small. There still would be no evidence that “the person who left
[the trace DNA] belongs to the same ethnic group as the defendant.” Such is the
nature of a general-population case. Yet, it would be obtuse to insist that the
comprehensive range of frequencies is not relevant in such a case because “the
evidence does not support a finding of preliminary fact that the perpetrator belongs
to the same racial/ethnic group.”21
In fact, the Prince court ultimately seems to reject its own demand for indepen-
dent proof of the perpetrator’s ethnicity. It expands “the perpetrator’s population”
to encompass “the general population” when it writes that “it is not enough to show
that the genetic profile is rare in a certain number of ethnic populations. Instead,
it must be shown either that the genetic profile is rare in the perpetrator’s ethnic
group or in the general population, as these are the perpetrator’s populations.”22
If the court is serious about allowing proof of the frequency “in the general popu-
lation,” then the puzzle in Prince is why proof that “the genetic profile is rare” in a
range of ethnic populations does not show that it is rare in the general population.
The court suggests that something is lacking – “a showing that [the frequencies] rep-
resent not just major population groups but the general population as a whole.”23
However, the opinion does not reveal what might constitute the requisite show-
ing, although it alludes to the possibility of expert testimony.24 Presumably, an
expert might opine that inasmuch as the general population is composed of ma-
jor population groups, the figures for these latter groups determine the figure for
the population as a whole. But this is an algebraic truth rather than a substan-
tive insight. If each major population group represents a proportion pj of the total
population, with a genotype frequency fj in each group, then the frequency in the
population is f =
∑
pjfj . Because each pj is between 0 and 1, this weighted aver-
age must lie between the largest and the smallest fj . Inasmuch as courts can take
judicial notice of mathematical theorems, expert testimony is not even necessary
when the “major population groups” exhaust the population.
In Prince, however, the criminalist did not give frequencies for a full partition
of the general population. Only Caucasian, Hispanic, and African-American fre-
quencies were presented. Even so, if these estimates – each in the trillionths – are
credible, then the frequencies in the omitted groups would have to be enormously
higher for the incriminating genotype to be anything other than “rare . . . in the gen-
eral population.” The limited number of subpopulations described in Prince makes
the inference from the three frequencies to the population something less than a
mathematical truism, but evidence need not be conclusive to be relevant. It need
only have “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact . . . .”25
The three numbers surely had some tendency to prove that the DNA match was
unlikely to be the result of coincidence. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, they arguably
covered 94% of the population of Kern County, where the crimes occurred.26
21Id. at 305. Another objection to the court’s rule is that “race/ethnicity” is not well defined.
Certainly, society is not partitioned into distinct genetic groups, but the court’s rule does not
presuppose any scientifically objective reality. Rather, it states that there must be independent
proof that the defendant falls into whichever category the prosecution adopts.
22Id. at 322.
23Id. at 323.
24Id. at 312.
25Cal. Evid. Code 210.
26The opinion does not specify the locations of the residences of the five victims. The DNA
samples from the two victims were analyzed at the Kern County laboratory, and the trial was held
in Kern County. Table 1 indicates that expanding the boundaries beyond Kern County would not
alter materially the racial and ethnic population proportions.
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Table 1
Population percentages (2000)
Kern County California USA
White 49.5 46.7 69.1
Hispanic 38.4 32.4 12.5
Black 6.0 6.7 12.3
Total 93.9 85.8 93.9
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, avail-
able at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html &
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06029.html.
Table 2
Kern county 9-locus genotype frequency for possible frequencies in the groups not included in
the criminalist’s statistics
Percent of Genotype Product Total
County pj Frequency fj pjfj
∑
pjfj
1. White 49.5 5.26× 10−10 2.61 × 10−10
2. Hispanic 38.4 3.85× 10−10 1.48 × 10−10
3. Black 6.0 1.10× 10−10 6.59 × 10−12
4. Other 6.1 f1 = 5.26× 10−10 3.21 × 10−11 4.47× 10−10
10f1 3.21 × 10−10 7.36× 10−10
100f1 3.21× 10−9 3.63× 10−9
1000f1 3.21× 10−8 3.25× 10−8
Using the percentages in Table 1 for Kern County, Table 2 shows the genotype
frequency in the county for a range of values of the frequency in the 6% of the
population not covered by the criminalist’s statistics. Even if the nine-locus geno-
type frequency among the people not included in the three groups were a thousand
times larger than the largest frequency in those groups, the frequency for the general
country population would be only about 3 in 100,000,000.
Of course, one can be skeptical of the criminalist’s likelihood ratios (which have
been used to derive the frequencies fj in Table 2). But this does not render them
irrelevant for the purpose of assessing how rare the nine-locus genotype is in the
county, state, or national population. As with any other relevant evidence, the lim-
itations in the statistics could have been explored on cross-examination.27 Also, it
could be argued that they are unfairly prejudicial or not generally accepted in the
scientific community (the standard for admitting scientific evidence in California)
and inadmissible for one of those reasons. But this is not what the Prince court said.
The court contended that even if the frequencies in the three major groups are per-
fectly accurate, they are logically irrelevant and give no useful guidance to the jury.
That position is untenable. The ethnicity of the perpetrator is not a “preliminary
fact” that must be established by independent evidence.28 In a general-population
case, statistics on racial, ethnic, or geographic groups have some tendency to show
how rare a DNA genotype is in the population of possible perpetrators. As such,
they are relevant.
27Unless the failure of Prince’s counsel to pursue this line of questioning amounted to consti-
tutionally inadequate representation (an argument that the court rejected, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d at 326
n.33), it is not a ground for reversing a conviction.
28For further discussion, see D.H. Kaye, Logical Relevance: Problems with the Reference Pop-
ulation and DNA Mixtures in People v. Pizarro, 3 Law, Probability & Risk 211 (2004).
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6. The misapplication of the preliminary-fact rule
Having incorrectly determined that the perpetrator’s ethnicity is a preliminary fact
that requires independent proof, the court in Prince proceeded to misapply this
preliminary-fact rule. It reasoned that the preliminary fact was proved by evidence
that linked the defendant and no one else in particular to the rapes:
In the present case, there was no direct evidence of the perpetrator’s ethnicity. How-
ever, direct evidence, such as a description from a percipient witness, is not the only
means of establishing the preliminary fact. Instead, the requisite fact can also be
established through other independent evidence (evidence not dependent upon the
profile match, match frequency, or the defendant’s ethnicity per se) that the defendant
is the perpetrator. The logic is as follows: If independent evidence establishes that the
defendant more likely than not is the perpetrator, and the defendant is Caucasian,
then independent evidence establishes . . . that the perpetrator more likely than not
is Caucasian. The preliminary fact of the perpetrator’s ethnicity is thus sufficiently
established so that match frequency statistics, computed from a Caucasian database,
are relevant to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator.29
The “independent evidence” that the court deemed sufficient to establish the pre-
liminary fact was
the actual evidence . . . that defendant is the perpetrator. . . . [E]vidence presented by
means of victim testimony showed that the perpetrator wore a ski mask and used a
flashlight with a colored lens. Appellant possessed such items; therefore, the evidence
establishes that appellant could be the perpetrator.30
And so, the court concluded that:
[s]ince the record sufficiently establishes that appellant is the perpetrator and there-
fore shares the perpetrator’s race, and appellant is Caucasian, the profile frequency
statistics derived from the Caucasian database, as testified to by [the criminalist],
were relevant. The evidence with respect to the other ethnic databases was not;
however, its admission did not prejudice appellant.31
This reasoning could be applied in virtually every case in which some evidence
beyond the DNA match incriminates the defendant. Such “independent evidence”
need not be extensive. It need only “be sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable
jury to conclude that it is more probable that the fact exists than that it does
not.”32 As a result, the practical impact of the Prince rule would be minimal.
As long as there is some non-DNA evidence to indicate that it is probable that
defendant committed the alleged crime, the prosecution can introduce the statistic
for the defendant’s ethnic or racial group. If the prosecution errs by presenting
other frequencies, the error will be harmless, for multilocus STR types are rare in
all ethnic and racial groups.
Not only does the court’s use of the non-DNA evidence against Prince (and only
Prince) to justify admitting the statistic for Caucasians eviscerate its preliminary-
fact requirement, but it also ignores the proper purpose for admitting the statistic.
The only reason that DNA statistics are used is to assess alternative hypotheses
by quantifying the probability of that the match would occur when an unrelated
individual is the source of the trace evidence and this person just happens to have
the same DNA genotype as the defendant. This unrelated individual might be of the
2936 Cal.Rptr.3d at 325 (citations and footnote omitted).
30Id. at 326. The court also alluded to “evidence [set out] at length in the unpublished portion
of our opinion . . . . Suffice it to say that items seized from appellant’s residence and car, as well
as appellant’s reaction when asked to give a buccal swab, are pertinent to our analysis. Although
none is sufficient standing alone, when considered cumulatively, they meet the . . . standard.” Id.
31Id.
32Id. at 325.
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same racial or ethnic group as the defendant, or he might not be. Evidence tending
to show that the defendant D, and no other individual I, is responsible for the crime
does nothing to clarify I’s status. It bears no relationship to the denominator of
the likelihood ratio in (5). It makes it more probable that the defendant is guilty,
of course, but it does not affect the probability that if the defendant is not the
perpetrator, someone of the same ethnicity is.
Consequently, the evidence described in Prince is not the type of “independent
evidence” that the court should demand. If foundational evidence were required, it
would have to point not just to the defendant, but more broadly to other members
his ethnic or racial group in contrast to other groups. Unless it can be said that
Caucasians as a group are especially likely to posses ski masks and flashlights with a
colored lenses, this evidence does not imply that the perpetrator is more probably
Caucasian than anything else. As a result, it does not, on the court’s premises,
justify upholding the admission of the Caucasian genotype frequency.
7. The real concern: prejudice
Thus far, I have argued that in a general-population case, DNA genotype frequencies
in major racial or ethnic groups are relevant. The Prince opinion denies this, but,
at bottom, the court’s concern could be prejudice, not relevance. In an earlier case,
People v. Pizarro,33 the same court of appeals introduced the flawed preliminary-
fact analysis to correct the fallacious reasoning of the prosecution in that case that
just because the defendant has a certain ancestry or ethnicity, whoever left the
DNA has the same ancestry or ethnicity. The Pizarro court wrote that
If the only way you can conclude the perpetrator fits a racial/ethnic category is to
assume the perpetrator was the same race/ethnic background as the suspect then the
reasoning is circular, i.e.: proof of the racial/ethnic background of the perpetrator
depends on the racial/ethnic background of the suspect from which we infer a sta-
tistical probability that the perpetrator is the suspect. . . . [W]e see no relevancy to a
database selected because of the racial/ethnic background of the suspect/defendant.
The problems created by employing assumed relevancy of the database are insidious.
A jury hears an astronomical figure that not uncommonly depends for its relevance
upon the very issue that they have to decide: is the defendant the perpetrator?34
In Prince, the court35 expanded on this criticism of the “circular” and “insidious”
prosecutorial reasoning.36 It complained that
Because of the way the evidence is presented, . . . use of the defendant’s ethnic popula-
tion without reference to that of the perpetrator, as occurred in Pizarro, ineluctably
points the finger at the defendant, even though it does not truly prove anything. On
the other hand, it presents jurors with a very subtle, but very insidious, form of racial
profiling: the assumption that the perpetrator and the defendant are the same race
and, therefore, that the defendant is the perpetrator.37
3312 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1992) (reversing and remanding); 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 21(Ct. App.
2003) (reversing again following the remand), review denied (Oct 15, 2003).
3412 Cal.Rptr.2d at 94 (footnote omitted).
35Judge Ardaiz wrote both opinions.
36The assumption that the defendant’s race or ethnicity determines the relevant population
is not confined to prosecutors. Defendants have used it to argue the prosecution’s statistics are
irrelevant or inapposite because they do not match the defendant’s subgroup. E.g., People v.
Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Westchester Co. Ct. 1992) (reasoning that inbreeding among Shiite
Muslims around Shushtar, Iran, was “of particular importance” because the defendant was a
physician born in Shushtar; however, the alleged crime was a sexual assault of a patient in New
York, not in Iran).
3736 Cal.Rptr.3d at 313.
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Although this criticism is overstated,38 the concern that the jury will misuse
valid information can be grounds for its exclusion. In Prince, the court of appeals
dismissed the state’s argument that the frequencies in Prince were indicative of
the general-population frequency, in part because it thought that “the statistical
calculations did not provide such evidence,” and in part because “they [were not]
proffered for that purpose.”39 We already have seen that it is implausible to argue
that frequencies in the trillionths in the three groups that collectively encompass
some 94% of the county’s population have no bearing on the question of whether
the genotype is rare in the immediate area, but it is true that the criminalist did
not make this point in so many words. Yet, for what other purpose could the three
numbers have been offered? To trick the jurors into thinking that merely because
the defendant was Caucasian, so was the culprit? Then why give the figures for
Hispanics and African-Americans? Why tell the jury that this procedure is used
regardless of the defendant’s specific race or ethnicity? And why inform the jury
that the point of the three statistics was to “extrapolate[] to the population at
large”?40
Moving beyond the details of Prince, it seems that in a general-population case,
the mere fact that a forensic scientist reports that a DNA genotype is rare in a
variety of subpopulations is not prejudicial. If anything, presenting a spectrum of
values should dissuade the jury from thinking that the suspect population is limited
to people exactly like the defendant. If so, the concern that the jury will misuse the
evidence in this way is not an adequate reason to exclude it.
Other procedures to avoid the risk of this cognitive error also could be employed,
and the Prince court enumerates several of them:
[W]hen the perpetrator’s ethnicity is unknown, the most appropriate solutions would
appear to be (1) to present the one most conservative frequency, without mention of
ethnicity, or (2) assuming this method is scientifically valid and results in a frequency
that is considered conservative, to present a single frequency calculation based on a
general, nonethnic population database. . . . When frequency calculations that do not
reference ethnicity are employed, the profile frequency evidence no longer tells jurors
that if the defendant and the perpetrator share ethnicity, the likelihood the defendant
is the perpetrator is some number. Instead, the evidence tells jurors that regardless
of the perpetrator’s ethnicity, the likelihood the defendant is the perpetrator is some
number. Jurors then have to decide whether, in their minds, the genetic profile is
sufficiently rare so as to be persuasive as to identification of the defendant as the
38The rhetorical flourish of “racial profiling” is a misnomer. In neither Pizarro nor Prince was
the defendant selected for investigation or prosecution because of his race – subtly or otherwise.
3936 Cal.Rptr.3d at 317 (emphasis added).
40Id. at 309 (footnote omitted). These words appear in the context of the following explanation:
What I need to do is determine how common is this profile in the population . . . . [¶]
The . . . three populations that I generally look at are Caucasian, Hispanic, African-
American. And I have some statistic[al] software to help out with the calculation part.
I enter the data in and the [software] will do the calculations for me and determine just
how common the profile is, you know, in this reference population, which extrapolates
to the population at large.
Id. The court offered the following interpretation of these remarks:
[W]e read this as meaning that the frequency calculated based upon the sample
(reference) Caucasian population extrapolates to the Caucasian population at large,
the frequency calculated based upon the sample Hispanic population extrapolates to
the Hispanic population at large, and the frequency calculated based upon the sample
African-American population extrapolates to the African-American population at
large.
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perpetrator.41
The court fails to explain why it calls for the most “conservative” figure as opposed
to the most accurate. Normally, the law should seek unbiased estimates. This is
true even though the burden of persuasion in a criminal case is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to the totality
of the evidence, not to each scrap of evidence.
As a practical matter, however, an expert or a party might prefer to make con-
servative assumptions in some situations, and the law should accept this choice.
For instance, one party might wish to forestall objections about missing data in
a statistical study by assuming that all the missing data would be adverse to its
position. If the overall result still favors this party, then the other side is in no po-
sition to argue that the study should be excluded because some data were missing.
With regard to DNA evidence, various methods for arriving at upper-bounds on
genotype frequencies in virtually any subpopulation have been devised. The no-
torious “ceiling principle” is one.42 More recently, a working group of a national
commission observed that:
The differences in [DNA genotypes] are mainly between individuals rather than be-
tween group averages. This means that the necessity for group classification could
be avoided by using an overall U.S. database and an appropriately increased value
of θ [a parameter that measures population structure]. This has been advocated by
some to avoid invoking any group identification. A θ value of 0.03 would usually be
appropriate.43
This would be one way to implement the Prince court’s desire for a race-blind figure
in a general-population case.44
8. Conclusion
In People v. Prince, the California Court of Appeals misapplied the legal doctrine of
conditional relevance to conclude that where the defendant was Caucasian, it was
error to introduce statistics on the frequency of a certain DNA genotype among
Hispanics and African Americans. In a general-population case like Prince, DNA
genotype frequencies in a range of racial or ethnic groups are relevant because
they bear on the alternative hypothesis that someone in the general population
41Id. at 313-314 (citation omitted).
42See generally Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science: An Update, National Re-
search Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996) (concluding that the ceiling
principle is not needed); Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, National Research
Council Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, DNA Technology in Forensic Sci-
ence (1992) (proposing the ceiling principle as a compromise); Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle,
Commentary: DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 Nature 735 (1994) (defending the
ceiling principle).
43National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing:
Predictions of the Research and Development Working Group 5 (2000).
44In a subpopulation case – one in which the alternative hypothesis is that the perpetrator is
from a specific racial or ethnic group – and “there is uncertainty about the population substructure,
as with isolated tribes or communities, or possible unsuspected relatives,” the working group
proposed “the Sib Method” for producing an upper bound:
The conditional match probability for a pair of sibs is determined mainly by simple
Mendelian rules and is relatively unaffected by allele frequencies (which may differ
among population subgroups) and unsuspected substructure, inbreeding, or presence
of relatives. Since no other relatives are as close as sibs, the match probability for
sibs provides a rough upper limit for the actual match probability.
Id. at 4.
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other than the defendant is the source of the DNA sample that incriminates the
defendant. When introduced for this purpose (and it is hard to see what other
purpose they could be introduced for), proof of these frequencies should not be
excluded as irrelevant.
At the same time, there have been cases in which judges or juries have assumed
that just because a defendant is a member of a particular race or ethnic group,
the DNA genotype frequency within that group is the only relevant figure. This
reasoning is potentially prejudicial to the defendant, and the Prince court was
justified in discussing ways to avoid this cognitive error. Certainly, the prosecution
should not overstate its case, but when the race or ethnicity of the perpetrator is
uncertain, explaining that DNA genotype frequencies vary among racial groups and
accurately displaying this variation does not exaggerate the evidence.
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